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Abstract 
A computational approach to uncertainty management requires support for interactive and 
incremental problem formulation, inference, hypothesis testing, and decision making. Most 
current uncertainty inference systems concentrate primarily on inference, and provide no sup­
port for the larger issues. We present a computational approach to uncertainty management 
which provides direct support for the dynamic, incremental aspect of this task, while at the 
same time permitting direct representation of the structure of evidential relationships. At the 
same time, we show that this approach responds to the modularity concerns of Beckerman and 
Horvitz [Heckerman & Horvitz, 1987]. This paper emphasizes examples of the capabilities of 
this approach. Another paper [D'Ambrosio, 1988] details the representations and algorithms 
involved . .  
1 Introduction 
A review of the literature on uncertainty in AI might lead one· to conclude that the problem 
consists solely of choosing an appropriate certainty calculus. However, a complete approach to 
uncertainty management requires support for interactive and incremental problem formulation, 
inference, hypothesis ranking, and decision making. Further, it should be based on a normative 
model of reasoning and decision-making under uncertainty, must provide support for defeasible 
decision-making about problem model formulation, and must offer ways of bounding the resources 
need for uncertainty management. 
In this paper we present an approach which begins to address these requirements. It is based 
on the belief that while Bayesian inference provides one possible "gold standard" for micro­
management of uncertainty, that is, describing and evaluating isolated instances of uncertainty 
reasoning, it ignores the macro-management aspects of reasoning with uncertainty, the problems 
of how an intelligent agent goes about structuring and revising situation models. In our approach, 
uncertainty is represented symbolically and structurally. The approach permits natural and in­
tuitive representations of commonly occurring evidential structures, permits analysis even in the 
face of weak, non-numeric information about beliefs, and yet conforms to a normative model of 
inference when full probability data is available. At the same time, the symbolic underpinnings 
of our approach also provide a mechanism for incremental construction, modification, and evalu­
ation of belief networks. We believe this to be an essential aspect of uncertainty reasoning which 
has been ignored in most previous research. In addition, they provide a natural mechanism for 
modelling macro-management of uncertainty reasoning as the dynamic construction and evalua­
tion of a set of related situation models, based on a subgoalling structure. In subsequent sections 
of this paper we first briefly introduce Hybrid Uncertainty Management (HUM), and then illus­
trate its operation by considering two examples which have appeared recently in the literature on 
uncertainty in AI. 
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2 Related Research 
Breese [Breese, 1987] has studied the problem of model formulation, starting from a database 
containing both logical and probabilistic knowledge. Laskey [Laskey, 1987] has independently 
begun developing a mapping for probabilistic knowledge into an ATMS similar to ours. Quin­
lan [Quinlan, 1987] has considered the problems of hard-wiring assumptions regarding model 
structure, and resulting limitations in expressivity. Henrion [Henrion, 1987], Pearl [Pearl, 1987], 
Shachter [Shachter & Heckerman, 1987], and others are studying performance models with the 
full expressivity of probability theory. 
3 Hybrid Uncertainty Management 
3.1 Issues and Overview 
Hybrid uncertainty management is a framework for reasoning with uncertain information based 
on the following principles: 
1. All information, including information about our uncertainty, should be represented us­
ing explicit, local representations. These representations should preserve the structure of 
information, as well as its "content". 
2. For efficient yet robust reasoning, representations must be such that they can be incremen­
tally constructed, evaluated, and modified, and the same uncertainty management capabili­
ties should be available to the agent when reasoning about construction of a model, as when 
reasoning about the domain problem. 
We are constructing1 an Uncertainty Inference System (UIS [Henrion, 1987]) in accordance 
with these principles, based on the logical inference capabilities of an Assumption-Based Truth 
Maintenance System (ATMS) [deKleer, 1986]. An ATMS provides a complete propositional logic. 
That is, given a set of atomic propositions and a set of logical formulas over those propositions, 
it computes the set of consistent assignments of truth values to a core set of propositions, and 
derives the truth value of every other proposition in terms of the truth values of the core set. 
Derived truth values are represented as expressions, in disjunctive normal form, for the truth of 
every proposition in terms of the truth of core propositions. It is this DNF expression, called 
a label in ATMS parlance, which provides the core structured representation for uncertainty in 
HUM. 
In creating HUM, we are developing mechanisms for using the representationa.I and inferential 
capabilities of an ATMS for both micro- and macro-management of reasoning with uncertainty. 
For micro-management, we have added mechanisms which permit the interpretation of selected 
assumptions as markers for elements of probability distributions, and have developed mappings for 
the basic expressions in a probabilistic model. This required developing the following components: 
1. A representation for a probability distribution - we use the ATMS choose operator to indicate 
that a set of assumptions represent a probability distribution, and annotate each assumption 
with the corresponding numeric probability, when available. 
2. A mapping for the basic computations of probabilistic inference - we use the ATMS justi­
fication as the primitive component of our representation for an probabilistic relationship 
between variables, and the ATMS environment propagation mechanism to perform inference. 
1 All the examples shown run in the current prototype. 
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3. A mechanism for retrieving probabilities from ATMS labels - we have developed an algorithm 
which can evaluate labels on request to reduce them to a numeric representation. 
For further details s� [D'Ambrosio, 1987b], (D'Ambrosio, 1988]. 
Macro-management requires the ability to: 
1. Represent and reason about the decisions involved in model construction. 
2. Recognize when inference at the domain level indicates problems in the model formulation, 
and revise domain models as appropriate. 
The domain models are constructed as ATMS networks, and ATMS assumptions are used to 
explicitly record defeasible model structure decisions. As we will show in an example below, this 
permits dynamic extension and revision, as well as incremental evaluation, of domain models. 
Our current implementation provides a mixed forward and backward chaining rule language in 
which model construction algorithms are written. Forward chaining is used to express the basic 
model construction algorithms, and backward chaining is invoked when information needed during 
model construction is unavailable. This architecture provides the same capabilities in response to 
model structure subgoals as are available at the domain level. .We illustrate in a second example 
how explicit recording of structuring decisions permits revision and incremental re-evaluation of 
domain models. 
3.2 Example One: The Three Urns 
We begin with a very simple example, the three urns problem described in (Heckerman & Horvitz, 1987]: 
Suppose you are given one of three opaque jars containing mixtures of black licorice 
and white peppermint jelly beans. The first jar contains one white jelly bean and 
one black jelly bean, the second jar contains two white jelly beans, and the third jar 
contains two black jelly beans. You are not allowed to look inside the jar, but you are 
allowed to draw beans from the jar, with replacement. That is, you must replace each 
jelly bean you draw before sampling another. Let Hi be the hypothesis that you are 
holding the ith jar. As you are told that the jars were selected at random, you believe 
that each Hi is equally likely before you begin to draw jelly beans. 
We can represent this situation in HUM in the following fashion2: 
;;; I have one of three possible urns 
(Variable Urn H1 H2 H3) 
;; every draw has two possible outcomes 
(Variable (Draw ?n) white black) 
The expression (Draw ?n) above states that we are describing, not a single draw, but a class of 
possible draws from an urn. Actual Draws will instantiate the logical variable ?n with a number 
1 .... We can express the conditional probability of drawing a white based on the urn we are 
holding as follows: 
2In the following psuedo-lisp examples, we simply present an expression when the value returned is not of interest. 
If the returned value is relevant, we precede the expression by > and show the result on the following line. 
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;;; probability of drawing white, for each urn: 
(Relation Urn (Draw ?n) . 
(-> (Urn H1) (((Draw ?n) white) .5)(((Draw ?n) black) .5)) 
(-> (Urn H2) (((Draw ?n) white) 1.0)) 
(-> (Urn H3) (((Draw ?n) white) 0.0))) 
Each "->" in this example corresponds to a rule. Finally, we can express our pre-existing infor­
mation about jars as follows: 
(Marginal Urn (Urn H1) .33 (Urn H2) .33 (Urn H3) .33) 
3.2.1 Incremental Symbolic Evaluation 
The above information serves to fully constrain the conditional probabilities for a class of possible 
situation models. Note, however, that the full joint distribution need never be explicitly repre­
sented, either in the problem statement or in the ATMS network: the label reduction algorithm 
can directly combine the marginals for each evidence source. At this point, the specific situation 
model constructed so far only contains the Urn variable. We ca.n now ask HUM for the probability 
that we are holding H2: 
>(Probability-of (Urn H2)) 
0.33 
We can also ask for the probability of selecting a white jelly bean, by first extending the model 
to include a first draw, and then querying the probability of various outcomes: 
(Instance (draw 1)) 
>(Probability-of ((draw 1) white)) 
.5 
Any of this could easily be done in several of the various UIS's currently available, and should 
seem rather boring (except, perhaps, for the ability to describe a class of variables, (Draw ?n). 
Consider, however, what happens once we actually draw a sample: 
(Deffactq ((draw 1) white)) 
>(Probability-of (Urn H2)) 
0.67 
(Instance (draw 2)) 
(Deffactq ((draw 2) white)) 
>(Probability-of (Urn H2)) 
0.8 
The system incrementally computes the new posterior for the various Urn hypotheses, by incre­
mentally extending the network and incrementally updating the structured representation for the 
probability of each urn . 
A fragment of the ATMS network corresponding to this problem is shown in figure 1. Arcs 
in the diagram represent ATMS justifications , in this case used to express conditional probability 
relationships between variables. The label of each value is shown in brackets under the value. 
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(UM1Hl) 
{{aat}} 
(UM1H2) 
{{aa,}} 
(UM1H3) 
{) 
((UM1Hl)- ((Drawl)w)) 
{{at}} 
((UM1 Hl) - ((Drato 1) b)) 
{{aa,}} 
{{}} 
1 
((Draw l)White) 
{ {}} 
((Drato l)Blacle) 
{} 
Figure 1: ATMS network for Urn Problem after Draw 1 
Thus, the ATMS records that hypothesis (Urn H2) is true precisely under the assumption aH2, 
wich carries the original marginal assigned, while ((Draw1)white) is true universally (that is, it 
is true in a environment which includes no assumptions). ((Draw1)black), on the other hand, is 
not supported in any environment. It may not be obvious from this example how the observation 
of draw 1 affects the probability of holding Urn· H2, since the label for Urn H2 is unchanged. 
This takes place through the nogood database, an ATMS maintained data structure containing 
a minim!U representation of all environments shown to be invalid. When ((Draw1)white) is 
asserted, the environments in the label of ((Draw1)black) become nogood. Since these include 
assumptions used to represent the marginal for Urns, the subsequently computed probability for 
any value of the Urns variable is changed. 
A complete computational treatment of uncertainty must meet a variety of requirements. Some 
are expressivity requirements, as identified by Heckerman and Horvitz (Heckerman & Horvitz, 1987]. 
Others arise from the dynamic nature of computation and interaction with the world. We have 
used this example to illustrate how several of these requirements are handled in HUM. We have 
shown how HUM handles mutual exclusivity, bidirectional inference (reasoning from causes to 
observables and observables to causes interchangeably), and one process aspect of reasoning with 
uncertainty, incremental construction and evaluation of models. Note also that this representation 
system does not suffer from the modularity problems observed by Heckerman and Horvitz when 
they considered the same example. The "rules" relating urns to outcomes need only be expr,essed 
once, and remain correct for any number of draws and any sequence of outcomes. 
3.3 Example 2 - Thousands Dead 
A major issue in uncertainty reasoning is the representation and use of correlated evidence. In 
this next example, taken from [Henrion, 1987], we examine reasoning about model structure and 
model revision. Specifically, we attempt to show that commonly occurring correlations between 
evidence sources are the result of structural relationships between such sources, and therefore are 
best supported by a system which permits direct expression of that structure: 
Chernobyl example: The first radio news bulletin you hear on the accident at 
the Chernobyl nuclear power plant reports that the release of radioactive materials 
may have already killed several thousand people. Initially you place small credence in 
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this, but as y ou start to hear similar reports from other radio and TV stations, and 
in the newspapers, you believe it more strongly. A couple of days later, you discover 
that the news reports were all based on the same wire-service report based on a single 
unconfirmed telephone interview from Moscow. Consequently, you greatly reduce your 
degree of belief again. 
We see two interesting issues here. The first)s expressivity. Henrion points out that " ... none of 
the better known UISs are actually capable of distinguishing between independent and correlated 
sources of evidence." One view is that the problem here is not probabilistic, but rather a logical 
uncertainty about the possible coreference of evidence for the various reports. The second is a 
process issue. What changes is ou:r beliefs about the structure of the evidential relationships. We 
are unaware of any existing UIS that is capable of accommodating this structural change. All 
require reconstructing the model in its entirety, which we claim is exorbitant and unrealistic. 
The information we have underconstrains the possible joint evidential relationship between 
news reports and the number dead. One possibility, advocated by Quinlan [Quinlan, 1987], is 
to abstain from committing, and compute a weak, interval-valued result. We believe this is 
unrealistic. Commitments must be made in the absence of conclusive data., based on reasonable 
assumptions about the situation being modelled. What is crucial is that a mechanism be provided 
through which an agent can reason about and record structural a.ssumptions. The structured 
uncertainty representation provided by an ATMS provides the bookkeeping necessary for such a 
mechanism, a.S we now show. 
Our initial knowledge is as follows: 
;;;thousands of people died 
(Variable lOOOs-dead true false) · 
;;;I heard in on the radio or in the Newspaper 
(Variable (Radio ?n) true false) 
(Variable (News ?n) true false) 
(Relation (Radio ?n) 1000s-dead 
(-> (((Radio ?n) true)) (((lOOOs-dead true) 1.0))) 
(Relation (News ?n) lOOOs-dead 
(-> (((News ?n) true)) ((( 1000s-dead true) 1.0))) 
;;;we know something about the source of news 
;;; upi, associated press, or independent 
(Variable (source (radio ?n)) elem upi ap ind) 
(Variable (source (news ?n)) elem upi ap ind) 
If we now assert the receipt of a radio report, we can compute the belief in thousands dead. 
(Instance (radio 1)) 
(Instance (source (radio 1))) 
;;; we tend to believe radio reports 
(Deffactq (Marginal (radio 1) .7 .3)) 
;;; we have no inform?-tion regarding source of info 
(Deffactq (marginal (source (radio 1)) (.33 .33 .34))) 
>(Probability-of ( lOOOs-dead true)) 
0.7 
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However, if we subsequently assert the receipt of a second radio report, or a newpaper report, 
the joint distribution is underconstrained, and the posterior belief in thousands-dead cannot be 
computed. if we assume. that each report provides independent evidence, then we have enough 
information to recover the complete joint distribution. Now what happens when we change our 
mind about the independence of the various reports? First we show system operation, then explain 
what happened: 
(Instance (news 1)) 
(Instance (source (news 1))) 
(Deffactq (Marginal (source (news 1)) ( .33 .33 .34))) 
(Deffactq (Marginal (news 1) (.7 .3))) 
** Assuming (Independent evidence-for (radio 1) (news 1)) *** 
** Monitoring (Same evidence-for (radio 1) (news 1)) *** 
>(Probability-of (lOOOs-dead true)) 
0.91 
(Deffactq (Same evidence-for (radio 1) (news 1))) 
** Retracting (Independent evidence-for (radio 1) (news 1)) *** 
>(Probability (lOOOs-dead true)) 
0.7 
·When reasoning about model structure, the system has all of the reasoning capabilities available 
at the domain model level. When it detects an attempt to instantiate a second relationship with 
(lOOOs-dead) as the consequent variable, it establishes a subgoal to determine the relationship 
between the two sets of antecedents. This subgoal is solved by constructing simple decision model, 
based on information provided above about evidence sources, which decides how to instantiate the 
evidence for the second report. In our example, the prior probability that sources are independent 
is high enough to result in the decision to instantiate the evidence for the second report as a 
separate, independent sou!ce of evidence. However, because the evidence for independence is not 
conclusive, a monitor is installed on the possibility that the evidence sources are the same. "When 
evidence later arrives that the sources of evidence for the two reports are in fact identical, this 
triggers the monitor to re-structure the domain model in accordance with the new information. 
This restructuring is accomplished by invalidating the previous evidence for (news 1) and sharing 
the evidence source for (radio 1) between the two reports. As we stated earlier, the assumption 
of independence is the statement of a lack of structural connection between the various reports. 
In order to make this assumption retractable, we condition the connection between the original 
evidence for (Mws 1) and (news 1) on the independence assumption. Thus, if the independence 
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assumption is a2, the above described situation is represented by the following ATMS network: 
((JUuliol)t) 
{ { a..u}} 
((.&dio 1)) f) 
{{ ll,otf}} 
(Ind (Radio l)(new.f 1)) 
{{a,}} 
((N ew&l)) f) 
{{a,.11a�}} 
The purpose for explicitly recording the independence assumption is to permit later retraction. 
When we later discover that the evidence for the reports is not independent, we retract the 
independence assumption, and extend the model to reflect our updated understanding of the 
situation (we omit some of the old arcs for clarity) : 
/ (1000 .. -deadt)� . 
� {{a..u}} � 
((.&diol) t) ((New .. l) t) 
{ { a..u}} { { a..u}} 
(SameEv-for (.&diol))(Neto.f l)) 
{{}} 
((.&diol))f) __;,.-----------..l..l---t((New .. l))f) 
{{ 4,.1f}} { { a,.l/}} 
3.4 Other Issues 
Various numeric uncertainty formalisms each have fervent adherents. We are more interested in 
the structure of such reasoning. In an attempt to understand the impact of the particular formal­
ism chosen on the process of reasoning under uncertainty, we are developing mappings similar to 
the one shown, based on both belieffunctions and fuzzy set theory. While we believe that we have 
developed representations capable of capturing any arbitrary probabilistic relationships among a 
set of variables (see [D 'Amb rosio, 1988]), we have barely begun to incorporate the machinery of 
decision analysis into this framework. Also, our current mechanisms for control of the reasoning 
process are crude and only handle a few special cases. We are incorporating our approach into a 
blackboard-like architecture which will provide more flexibility in control of uncertain inference. 
The structured symbolic representation provides fertile ground for exploring the problem of expla­
nation of results, a topic we have not yet begun to explore. Finally, our current implementation 
is an early. prototype, and its speed is marginally adequate for the experiments we would like to 
run. 
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4 Summary 
We have presented an approach to uncertain inference which emphasizes both expressivity and 
process. We identify two aspects of expressivity: adequacy and economy. We have illustrated 
through examples that this approach is not only adequately expressive, but also economical, in 
that it captures structurally commonly occurring classes of evidential relationships. Equally criti­
cal, we emphasize tll.e need to support the process of uncertain inference, that is, the incremental 
construction and evaluation of probabilistic domain models. 
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